The SOE reform in China/周大勇

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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

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执行通知曾是法院强制执行的前置程序,即在采取强制执行措施前,必须指定一个期限给被执行人自动履行,逾期不履行的,才能采取强制执行措施。新修改的民事诉讼法第二百四十条规定:“执行员接到申请执行书或者移交执行书,应当向被执行人发出执行通知,并可以立即采取强制执行措施。”该规定彻底废除了执行通知作为强制执行措施的前置程序,赋予了法院在执行程序中的即时强制执行权。


一、执行通知仍应当发出


现行民诉法只是废除了执行通知作为强制执行措施的前置程序,并没有取消执行通知。笔者认为,执行通知本身没有弊端,只是作为强制执行措施的前置程序会产生弊端,所以民诉法作了修正。执行通知的存在具有其程序价值,即在执行阶段确保被执行人知情权的实现,以一定的方式告知被执行人案件已进入执行程序。


二、执行通知的适用


(一)执行通知的内容


一般来说,应当写明当事人的名称、案由、执行依据的名称、作出执行依据单位和作出时间、该执行依据已经发生法律效力、立案执行时间、责令被执行人履行该执行依据确定的义务,以及按照民事诉讼法第二百五十三条规定承担迟延履行期间的加倍债务利息或者迟延履行金,并承担执行费用。


(二)执行通知应在何时发出


由于执行通知主要是对被执行人进行程序性告知,笔者认为,应把握一个原则,就是执行案件立案后尽快发出。根据《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国民事诉讼法〉执行程序若干问题的解释》第三十条中的规定:“立即采取强制执行措施的,可以同时或者自采取强制执行措施之日起三日内发送执行通知书。”以及《最高人民法院关于人民法院执行工作若干问题的规定(试行)》第二十四条规定:“人民法院决定受理执行案件后,应当在三日内向被执行人发出执行通知书。”应分两种情况:一是受理执行案件后没有立即采取强制措施的,应当在三日内发出执行通知书;二是受理执行案件后,立即采取强制执行措施的,可以同时或者自采取强制执行措施之日起三日内送达执行通知书。


(三)如何处理执行通知与强制执行措施之间的关系


现行民诉法废除了执行通知作为强制执行措施的前置程序,法院行使即时强制执行权不受是否已发出执行通知的限制。进入执行程序后,及时对被执行人的财产进行查找并采取控制性强制执行措施,防止被执行人转移、隐匿财产,以实现及时、高效执行。在对被执行人的财产采取处分性强制执行措施之前,应当发出执行通知,除了程序性告知外,指定期间自行履行,减少处理财产带来的费用支出。对此,现行民诉法第二百四十七条规定:“财产被查封、扣押后,执行员应当责令被执行人在指定期间履行法律文书确定的义务。被执行人逾期不履行的,人民法院应当拍卖被查封、扣押的财产。”所以笔者认为,执行通知不是控制性强制执行措施的前置程序,但是在采取处分性强制执行措施之前应当发出执行通知,实践中应把握好两者的关系。


(作者单位:广东省电白县人民法院)

关于实行监察书制度的若干规定(试行)

广东省广州市人民政府


关于实行监察书制度的若干规定(试行)
广州市人民政府



第一条 为了对监察对象实行有效的监督,使监察工作逐步实现规范化、制度化,根据国务院关于“国家行政监察机关具有检查权、调查化、建议权和一定的行政处分权”的规定和监察部的有关规定,特制定本规定(试行)。
第二条 监察书,分为监察通知书、监察建议书和监察决定书三种。
监察书统一由广州市监察局印制。
第三条 监察书的适用范围是:市、区、县人民政府各部门及其工作人员;市、区、县人民政府及各部门任命的人员。
第四条 凡有下列情形之一者,监察机关可分别不同情况发出监察通知书、监察建议书或监察决定书:
(一)对于不执行、不正确执行或拖延执行国家法律、法规、政策以及国家计划的行为,要求其执行或正确执行的;
(二)对于发布不适当的决议、命令、指示,要求其纠正或撤销的;
(三)对于录用、任命或奖惩不当,要求其纠正或撤销的;
(四)对于正在或者可能损害国家利益或公民权益的行为需要制止、纠正、采取补救措施的;
(五)对于失职或工作失误,需要纠正、改进、吸取教训挽回影响的;
(六)涉及监察事项,需向个人调查核实的;
(七)涉及监察事项,需被监察单位报送有关文件、资料及其他必要情况材料的;
(八)涉及监察事项,需被监察单位或其上级主管机关查处或协助监察机关查处的;
(九)涉及监察事项,需向有关单位查阅、复制有关文件、资料及了解其他必要情况的;
(十)涉及监察事项,需有关部门协助查办的;
(十一)涉及监察事项,需扣留、封存可以证明违法违纪行为的文件、资料、物品和其他非法所得的;
(十二)涉及监察事项,需查核其银行存款和暂时停止支付其存款的;
(十三)涉及监察事项,要求其在规定时间、地点向监察机关作出解释和说明,或提供有关材料的;
(十四)要求被监察单位或其上级主管机关暂停有严重违法违纪嫌疑人员行使职权的;
(十五)经查证确实有违法违纪行为的人员,建议该单位或上级主管机关对其给予行政处分的;
(十六)监察机关根据有关法律、法规、政策作出监察决定需要发出书面通知的;
(十七)对于监察机关作出的决定拖延执行或者执行不力的;
(十八)对于模范遵纪守法、廉洁奉公、成绩显著的单位或个人,建议该单位或其上级主管机关给予表彰或奖励的;
(十九)对于检举揭发重大违法违纪行为的有功人员,建议该单位或其上级主管机关给予表彰奖励的。
第五条 对监察书提出的要求、建议、决定,要认真对待,在规定期限内予以实施,并将实施结果告监察机关。无正当理由拒不采纳的,监察机关可对被监察单位给予警告、通报批评;对被监察个人给予批评教育,情节严重的,给予必要行政处分。
第六条 对监察书的要求、建议、决定有异议的,可向发出监察书的监察机关提出,监察机关应尽快给予回复。如被监察单位或个人对回复仍有异议,由监察机关提请本级人民政府或上一级监察机关决定。
第七条 监察书实行首长签发负责制,根据监察书的内容重要程度,由监察机关主要负责人或分管领导签发。
第八条 监察人员要严格执行本规定,严禁利用职权滥发监察书。对违反本规定造成不良后果的,要追究责任。
第九条 不设监察室的市直单位,其行使行政监察职能的部门,可参照本规定执行。
第十条 本规定由市监察局负责解释。
第十一条 本规定自公布之日起试行。




1989年7月8日