The SOE reform in China/周大勇

作者:法律资料网 时间:2024-06-16 11:49:10   浏览:8720   来源:法律资料网
下载地址: 点击此处下载


The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

下载地址: 点击此处下载

抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法(2002年修正)

辽宁省抚顺市人民政府


抚顺市人民政府关于修改《抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法》的决定

[抚顺市人民政府98号令]
[2002-12-25]

  抚顺市人民政府第68次常务会议决定对《抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法》作如下修改:
  一、第二条修改为:“凡在本市城乡从事营业性机动车辆客、货运输,人力车、畜力车运输(含装卸、搬运、货物车辆配载服务)的个体工商户,均应遵守本办法。”
  二、第三条增加一项,作为第(五)项:“法律法规规定的其他管理权限。”
  三、第四条修改为:“符合国家政策规定有经营能力的人员,可以申请从事个体运输业。”
  四、第五条第(四)项修改为:“个人合伙经营的,有载明合伙经营的投资者人数、资金数额、盈余分配、债务承担、入伙、退伙等事项的书面协议。”
  五、第六条修改为:“凡申请从事个体运输经营的人员,必须向工商行政管理机关出具居民身份证或户口簿、原职业证明,及国家法律法规规定必须具备特定条件应提交的有关批准文件、行车执照、驾驶执照、运输经营许可证、保险凭证等有关证件。”
  六、第八条修改为:“工商行政管理机关自受理之日起7日内作出审核决定,核准登记的,发给营业执照;不予登记的,书面通知申请人并说明理由。”
  七、第十一条修改为:“个体运输业户必须在营业执照核准的经营范围内从事经营,不得擅自扩大经营范围。”
  八、删去第十二条。
  九、第四章罚则作为第五章收费管理作为第四章。
  十、第二十一条作为十七条,修改为“个体运输业户应当按照《城乡个体工商户管理暂行条例》和国家、省、市有关工商行政管理收费的规定向工商行政管理机关缴纳注册登记费和工商管理费。”
  十一、第二十二条作为第十八条,修改为:“个体运输业户应当于每月1日至10日,向工商行政管理机关缴纳工商管理费,逾期未缴纳的,每日按应缴管理费额的确2%加收滞纳金。”
  十二、第十八条作为第十九条,修改为:“个体运输业户有下列行为之一的,由工商行政管理机关予以处罚:
  (一)无照经营的,予以取缔,没收非法所得,并处5000元以下罚款;
  (二)擅自改变经营者姓名和经营场所的,给予警告,或者处以1000元以下罚款;
  (三)擅自改变经营实体字号或者名称的,处以5000元以下罚款;
  (四)擅自改变经营方式或者超越经营范围的,责令改正,没收非法所得,可以并处5000元以下罚款;
  (五)出租、转借、出卖、涂改营业执照及其副本的,没收非法所得,可以并处5000元以下罚款,情节严重的,应当吊销营业执照,持假营业执照的,应没收其假营业执照和非法所得,可以并处1万元以下罚款;
  (六)不携带营业执照经营或者标志不全的,处以50元以下罚款;
  (七)无正当理由未按规定到原发照机关办理年度验照手续的,收缴其营业执照,予以注销。”
  十三、第二十条作为第二十一条,修改为:“个体运输业户对工商行政管理机关作出的行政处罚不服的,可以根据《中华人民共和国行政复议法》的规定申请行政复议。”
  十四、删去第二十五条。
  此外,根据本决定对部分条文顺序、文字作相应调整。
  本决定自公布之日起施行。
  《抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法》根据本决定作相应修正,重新公布。
     《抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法》

  (1991年6月20日抚顺市人民政府令第20号发布,根据2002年12月25日《抚顺市人民政府关于修改<抚顺市个体运输业工商行政管理暂行办法>的决定》修正)
    第一章  总   则
  第一条  为加强对个体运输业的监督管理,促进个体运输业的健康发展,根据《城乡个体工商户管理暂行条例》等规定,结合本市实际,制定本办法。
  第二条  凡在本市城乡从事营业性机动车辆客、货运输,人力车、畜力车运输(含装卸、搬运、货物车辆配载服务)的个体工商户,均应遵守本办法。
  第三条  工商行政管理机关对个体运输业履行下列监督管理职能:
  (一)对经营个体运输业的申请进行审核、登记颁发营业执照;
  (二)对个体运输业的经营活动进行监督管理,保护合法经营,取缔非法经营,查处违章违法行为,维护经营秩序;
  (三)协同公安、交通、城建等部门对个体运输业户的经营活动进行管理;
  (四)对个体运输业劳动者协会的工作给予指导;
  (五)法律法规规定的其他管理权限。
    第二章  登记管理
  第四条  符合国家政策规定有经营能力的人员,可以申请从事个体运输业。
  第五条  申请从事个体运输业,必须具务下列条件:
  (一)有与从事个体运输业相适应的符合行业技术标准的交通运输工具(包括机动车和非机动车辆),出租车必须喷涂营运标志,装置顶灯和经检验合格的里程计价器;
  (二)有与经营规模相适应的自有资金;
  (三)有相应的符合职业条件的从业人员;
  (四)个人合伙经营的,有载明合伙经营的投资者人数、资金数额、盈余分配、债务承担、入伙、退伙等事项的书面协议;
  (五)有个体运输户与司乘人员以及装卸、搬运、维修人员签订的雇工合同。
  第六条  凡申请从事个体运输经营的人员,必须向工商行政管理机关出具居民身份证或户口簿、原职业证明,国家法律法规规定必须具备特定条件应提交的有关批准文件、行车执照、驾驶执照、运输经营许可证、保险凭证等有关证件。
  第七条  具备本办法第五、六条规定条件的,向工商行政管理机关提出局面申请,工商行政管理机关对申请及营业条件进行审查,核准登记,颁发营业执照。
  第八条  工商行政管理机关自受理之日起7日内作出审核决定,核准登记的,发给营业执照;不予登记的,书面通知申请人并说明理由。
    第三章 营运管理
  第九条  营业执照及其副本是从事个体运输业的合法经营凭证,个体经营业户在营运时,必须随车携带营业执照,接受工商行政管理机关的监督、检查。
  营业执照及其副本除工商行政管理机关依照法定程序可以扣缴外,任何机关、单位或个人不得扣缴。
  第十条  营业执照及其副本不得涂改、出借、出租、出卖或伪造,个体运输业户在经营时,必须人照相符。
  第十一条  个体运输业户必须在营业执照核准的经营范围内从事经营,不得擅自扩大经营范围。
  第十二条  个体运输业户必须使用有税务机关检印的专用票据,加盖经营者印章,不准私制和转借营运票据,不准使用非统一印发的票据。
  第十三条  个体运输业户兼营贩运的,必须办理增项登记,非营业性运输转为营业性运输的,必须按规定办理营业执照,未办理营业执照而从事营业性运输的,视为无照经营。
  第十四条  个体运输业户领取营业执照后,满六个月未营运的,视为自动歇业,由原登记机关收缴营业执照,予以注销。
  第十五条  个体运输业户必须在规定的时间内,到原登记发照机关办理年度验照手续,营业执照有效期满应当办理换照手续。逾期不办理上述手续继续营运的,视为无照经营。
  第十六条  个体运输业户办理停业或歇业必须提前10日向原登记发照机关提出申请,经批准停业的,营业执照及副本由原登记机关收回保管;经批准歇业的,应当办理注销登记手续,原登记发照机关收缴营业执照正、副本及印章,予以注销。
    第四章  收费管理
  第十七条  个体运输业户应当按照《城乡个体工商户管理暂行条例》和国家、省、市有关工商行政管理收费的规定向工商行政管理机关缴纳注册登记费和工商管理费。
  第十八条  个体运输业户应当于每月1日至10日,向工商行政管理机关缴纳管理费,逾期未缴纳的,每日按应缴管理费额的2%加收滞纳金。
    第五章  罚   则
  第十九条  个体运输业户有下列行为之一的,由工商行政管理机关予以处罚:
  (一)无照经营的,予以取缔,没收非法所得,并处5000元以下罚款;
  (二)擅自改变经营者姓名和经营场所的,给予警告,或者处以1000元以下罚款;
  (三)擅自改变经营实体字号或者名称的,处以5000元以下罚款;
  (四)擅自改变经营方式或超越经营范围的,责令改正,没收非法所得,可以并处5000元以下罚款;
  (五)出租、转借、出卖、涂改营业执照及其副本的没收非法所得,可以并处5000元以下罚款,情节严重的,应当吊销营业执照,持假营业执照的,应没收其假营业执照和非法所得,可以并处1万元以下罚款;
  (六)不携带营业执照经营或者标志不全的,处以50元以下罚款;
  (七)无正当理由未按规定到原发照机关办理年度验照手续的,收缴其营业执照,予以注销。
  第二十条  个体运输业户被吊销营业执照后,六个月内不得申请从事个体运输业。
  第二十一条  个体运输业户对工商行政管理机关作出的行政处罚不服的,可以根据《中华人民共和国行政复议法》的规定申请行政复议。
    第六章  附   则
  第二十二条  私营企业从事营业性运输的,适用本办法,
  第二十三条  个人承包企事业单位运输工具从事营业性运输的,适用本办法。
  第二十四条  本办法自公布之日起施行。;


浙江省公安厅 浙江省财政厅关于印发《浙江省消防安全有奖举报办法》的通知

浙江省公安厅 浙江省财政厅


浙江省公安厅 浙江省财政厅关于印发《浙江省消防安全有奖举报办法》的通知


浙江省消防安全有奖举报办法


第一条 为充分发挥社会舆论和群众监督作用,及时发现和制止消防违法行为,消除火灾隐患,预防重特大火灾事故特别是群死群伤恶性火灾事故发生,根据《中华人民共和国消防法》等有关消防法律法规和《浙江省公众聚集场所消防安全八条常态严管措施》等规定,特制定本办法。
第二条 本办法适用的有奖举报是指存在下列消防违法行为或者火灾隐患,可能导致重大人员伤亡或者财产损失的情形:
(一)公众聚集场所未经消防安全检查合格擅自投入使用、营业的;
(二)公众聚集场所违反规定储存、燃放烟花爆竹,危及公共安全的;
(三)公众聚集场所营业期间违反规定进行电焊、气焊等明火作业的;
(四)公众聚集场所违反规定,大量采用聚氨酯泡沫塑料等易燃、可燃材料装修装饰的;

(五)公众聚集场所的火灾自动报警系统、自动灭火系统等消防设施严重损坏的;
(六)公众聚集场所疏散通道堵塞、安全出口上锁的;
(七)公众聚集场所在疏散通道的门窗上设置影响逃生和灭火救援的铁栅栏等障碍物的;
(八)公众聚集场所擅自拆封或者使用被公安机关消防机构查封的场所、部位的;
(九)生产、储存、经营易燃易爆危险品的场所与居住场所设置在同一建筑物内,或生产、储存、经营其他物品的场所与居住场所设置在同一建筑内且不符合国家工程建设消防技术标准的;
(十)其他可能严重威胁公共安全的重大火灾隐患。
第三条 获得本办法规定的有奖举报应当同时具备以下条件:
(一)举报的消防违法行为或者火灾隐患事先未被公安机关消防机构掌握;
(二)举报的消防违法行为或者火灾隐患经查证属实,并依法处罚的;
(三)举报人系非专职从事消防管理的工作人员;
(四)举报奖励对象限于实名举报。
第四条 举报人可通过电话、来信、传真、网络、当面陈述等多种形式举报。举报人应注明本人的姓名、住址、居民身份证号码、工作单位、联系电话等有关情况。
第五条 举报人应当向公安机关消防机构如实报告消防违法行为或者火灾隐患的详细情况,包括:单位名称,地址,有关消防违法行为或者火灾隐患的具体时间、地点和内容,其他相关证明材料、重要证据或其他调查线索。
第六条 举报人应严格遵守国家的法律法规和有关规定,实事求是地反映问题,不得歪曲事实、胡编乱造,更不得恶意举报。
第七条 全省统一举报电话96119,专门负责举报受理,接待受理时间为每个工作日。
第八条 各地市公安消防支队接到举报后,应当按照有关规定及时进行核查,并依法处理。
第九条 举报事项的核查情况,不论是否相符,均向举报人反馈情况。对举报事项的处理情况,应在核查并处理后的5个工作日内回复举报人;对于经核实符合有奖举报条件的,告知举报人按规定领取奖励。
第十条 每起有效举报,根据存在消防违法行为或者火灾隐患的性质、可能造成的危害程度、社会影响,视情给予50元至500元人民币的奖励。
第十一条 对举报的同一消防违法行为或者火灾隐患,不实施重复奖励,只奖励第一举报人;对联名举报同一消防违法行为或者火灾隐患的,公安机关消防机构应视为一次举报,平均奖励举报人。
第十二条 举报人应当自接到通知之日起30个工作日内到指定地点领取奖金,逾期未领者,视为自动放弃。举报人领取奖励时,应携带本人身份证原件,并签署本人真实姓名和填写身份证号码。
第十三条 各地消防安全有奖举报受理中心及其有关工作人员对举报人负有保密义务,不准向外界透露举报人的情况以及举报的具体情节,举报材料不得私自摘抄、复印,非经举报人同意不得公开。
第十四条 各级财政部门要做好同级公安消防部门举报奖励经费保障工作,根据需要将举报奖励经费纳入同级公安消防部门预算。
第十五条 各级公安机关消防机构和财政部门应当制定执行奖励的申报、审批、发放程序。
第十六条 严格奖励标准和程序。违规奖励的,依照有关规定依法查处。
第十七条 本办法自公布之日起施行。



浙江省公安厅
浙江省财政厅
二0一0年五月十日